Rishav Devrani and Poojan Bulani
In response to calls for reforming the political structure, thousands of people have taken to the streets in protests that have3 occasionally resulted in violence among the protestors and the police over the last two years. Leaders of activist groups have faced charges like alleged defamation of the monarchy. Thailand’s “Section 112,” also known as the lese majeste law, makes it illegal to disrespect the monarchy. The charge carries a maximum punishment of 15 years in jail if convicted. The death of King Bhumibol has added to the country’s and monarchy’s instability resulting in a vicious cyclical crisis of legitimacy, with coups and mass civil disobedience deployed as political setups. To make things worse, the incumbent King Vajiralongkorn has failed to create genuine political stability, allowing the military to assert itself as an arbiter under the Thai Constitutional monarchy.
A Glance at The Protestors’ Narrative
Thai youths have widened the ambit of the protests by taking advantage of the many avenues of online conversation about the monarchy, challenging the usual flow of information giving the protests a distinctive flair. Adding to this, transnational factors also played a role in shaping the movement’s contours. The Milk Tea Alliance was a huge supporter of the Thailand demonstrators. The alliance successfully moved internet discussions about fundamental barriers to democracy into street activism and protest systems headed by the words of netizens. This newly enhanced cooperation among the region’s many protest movements demonstrates how supposedly helpless people may have a presence and compel the entire public’s attention. Indeed, this reveals a model of protests seen around the world colouring them highly cultural.
Intersection of Monarchy and Military
The Thai monarchy with its unfettered informal rule along with the powerful military has vociferously controlled the Thai political atmosphere, barring no space for an alternative challenge. However, under the present King, this dual ruling force is facing a new crisis of confidence, as evidenced by the ten articulate demands explicitly laid down by the protesters and activists.
These two pillars that control the nation had used a range of tools to consolidate power, including political propaganda and aggrandisement initiatives that glorified the monarchy exorbitantly to create the “network monarchy” that weaves careful networks with powerful structures and directs military interventions in the form of coups to tamp down disobedient governments.
These protestsdemand revolutionary policy changes such as separating the king’s private possessions from the Crown Property Bureau by repealing the Crown Property Act 2018 as well as reducing the King’s share in the allocation of the national budget. The protestors, in their list of demands, demanded the revocation of Article 6 of the 2017 Constitution that prohibits accusations against the Crown and the revocation of the lese mejeste law. The youths demanded amnesty and freedom of expression for anyone that raised their voice against the Monarch.
Another chain of reforms put forth was the abolition of the Privy Council and other royal offices thereby putting an end to royal interference in diplomacy and investigation of the abductions and mortalities of anti-monarchy protestors. The ten-point proposal is ground-breaking since the monarchy is venerated and untouchable. Adding to this, the use of social media and memes to propel the message and agenda of the protestors has caught the eye of a transnational wave of support for the protestors.
These demands were not made to overthrow the monarchy but were put forth because the protestors want the constitutional monarchy to revisit its understanding of human rights like the right to freedom of expression.
The Bone of Contention: Lèse Majesté Law
A major tool utilised as a counterblow to the ongoing protest is the infamous lèse majesté law enshrined under Section 112 of the Thai Penal code. An ancient law, strived towards ensuring that no insults, defamatory remarks, or threats are guided towards the King, the Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent attracts a three to fifteen years imprisonment in case of conviction. It is consistent with Section 6 of the 2017 Thai Constitution which states that, places the king in a position of revered worship and protects him from any accusation or action. Further, Section 50 casts a duty upon the citizens to protect and uphold the King. The law is a consequence of the divinity ascribed to the monarchy, which is not unique to Thailand alone, though it does have one of the stricter laws. None of the other countries prescribe such a lengthy sentence; for example, Spain provides for imprisonment up to 2 years, Cambodia up to 5 years, etc.
However, the criticism against the Thai law has always been centered around its ambiguity, application, lack of bail and long-term sentences passed upon conviction. Charging a 16-year-old kid and a 65-year-old woman with an initial sentence of 87 years under the infamous lèse majesté law are a few of the instances that have invited widespread criticism from domestic crowds and international organisations and have highlighted its misuse by the government. The use of Section 112 against a politician questioning vaccine politics in Thailand, solidified the claim that the law is being used inconsistently and irrationally by the government to silence any opposition. The ambiguity and misuse have gradually eroded the initial concept of lèse majesté. Subsequently a lack of offence against torture and enforced disappearance makes it threatening.
This has not always been the case. The 1934 revision of the lèse majesté law under erstwhile Article 104(1) of the Penal Code, placed good faith and common good above all. It provided for an exception if, such remarks or statements were made for the public good or in good faith, which would not be tantamount to violation of the lèse majesté provision. Thereby, putting a restrain upon the broad clause. However, the exception was removed in 1949 and the current version of the provision was introduced in 1959. The major turn point was the addition of the word ‘insult’ which led to the current ambiguity and misuse that surrounds the offense.
Impact on INternational Obligations
Thailand is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 19 of ICCPR guarantees the right to hold opinions and freedom of speech and expression. The law is clearly in violation of the clause. The defenders of lèse majesté law utilise the restriction provided under Article 19 (3) in the name of “public morals” as a justification for the offence. The reality, however, stands in stark contrast considering instances wherein there has been no immediate, eminent or evident threat to the so-called public morals. It also contravenes Article 23 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration providing for the right to freedom of opinion and expression, to which Thailand is a party.
Although the lèse majesté law was challenged in 2012, the Constitutional Bench of Thailand [1] unanimously ruled in favor of its constitutionality. It shunned away arguments of global proportionality standards, citing the sacred character of the King and the unique nature of the Thai monarchy. The government has also time and again defended the law at the international level on similar grounds. While the Constitution Bench still refuses to meddle with the law, they haven’t shied away from condemning and convicting the protestors calling for reforms.
Conclusion
Political dialogue and freedom of speech are quintessential for any format of a constitutional setup. It is productive towards ensuring better governance and even instilling faith in a constitutional monarchy like that of Thailand. While repressive instruments like the lèse majesté law might not be unique to Thailand, its misuse by the military garbed by the monarchical veneer to shun any resistance is what makes it grave. As the distinction between the application of the law towards criticism against the state and the king is diminishing, one has to question if the state is ascribing the notion of divinity towards its pedestal? Although the future of Section 112 remains unclear, it’s high time Thailand volte-face its stance toward human rights violations with the global community noting its every move.
The authors are final year students from Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab
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Author CASIHR RGNUL
